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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

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Reviewed by: Elijah Kelly Jr.

SUBJECT: Vance-Gromyko Meeting, SALT, CTB
Date: 7/29/80

DATE: July 13, 1978
Time: 10:40 am to 1:30 pm
Place: Soviet Mission,
Geneva

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PARTICIPANTS: U.S.

U.S.S.R.

Secretary Vance
Ambassador Warnke
Ambassador Toon*
Mr. William D. Krimer
(Interpreter)

Foreign Minister Gromyko
First Deputy Foreign Minister
Korniyenko
Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov*
Mr. A. M. Petrosyants*
Ambassador Dobrynin*
Mr. V. M. Sukhodrev
(Interpreter)

Distribution: NSC, S/MS, PM

*These participants joined the discussion at 11:50 am for discussion of CTB matters.

SALT

Minister Gromyko said it was his understanding that the Secretary had some questions in connection with the "core" of Gromyko's statement of the day before. He supposed that one of these questions concerned the words "within the limits of the relevant aggregate levels of strategic arms and MIRVed vehicles." He would clarify that "MIRVed vehicles" referred to the levels for ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs. Given the solution of other questions, this one, too, can be resolved. Another question might concern the number of reentry vehicles on SLBMs. This was an issue that could be taken up and discussed by the Delegations. Yesterday Gromyko had been talking about ICBMs. The number of reentry vehicles on ICBMs could also be a matter for the Delegations.

The Secretary said he had several questions to ask. The first was as follows: when Gromyko had spoken of accepting the U.S. position on "new types of ballistic missiles," had he meant our full position, including criteria for limiting their modernization?

WDKramer:ejg
(Drafting Office and Officer)

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BY S/SI

Gromyko acknowledged that the question of modernization was a valid one. It has been under discussion between the two Delegations, and discussion of that question not having been completed, it would obviously have to be continued. In his view this question should not have arisen at all today, because it included such things as criteria, degree of permissible modernization, etc. Regardless of what solution might eventually be found for the new types issue, this question would still remain. He did not think that the Secretary and he would be able to invent something new in order to resolve it. Obviously it would have to be dealt with by the Delegations and brought to a mutually acceptable solution.

The Secretary said he wanted to be more specific. He would ask whether there would be a ban on increasing the number of reentry vehicles on existing ICBMs, as provided for in all our positions?

Gromyko said it clearly followed from the positions of both sides that agreement on this matter was contingent upon agreement on the major issue. Naturally this question must be settled, and the Soviet side was ready to reach agreement on limiting number of reentry vehicles. What these limits would be would have to be discussed, but he did not think that this would prove to be a major obstacle to agreement.

The Secretary asked whether the words "in the event that the Soviet Union were to consent..." meant that all the elements of our proposals on ICBMs and SLBMs would be accepted, such as for example the definition of new types?

Gromyko said that this question was related to the question of modernization of existing missiles, which the Secretary had raised yesterday and which Gromyko had answered clearly: it would be subject to further discussion between the Delegations and would require joint determination of the maximum degree of permitted modernization, of where modernization stopped being modernization and produced a new type of missile. That would clearly have to be determined by means of discussions between the Delegations. When Gromyko had spoken of the Soviet Union's consenting to U.S. proposals, he had meant, as clearly spelled out in his "core statement" the proposal that for the duration of the Treaty, i.e., through 1985, within the limits of the relevant aggregate levels of strategic arms and MIRVed vehicles, each side would have the right to flight-test and to deploy one new type of ICBM which it could equip at its own discretion either with MIRVs or with a single reentry vehicle. The Soviet side was not attaching any other meaning to this statement beyond the specific meaning of these words. Thus, he had not addressed the question of modernization and did not think that it was a suitable subject for their discussion today. Otherwise, they might have to spend as much as two or three weeks here in Geneva and sacrifice whatever vacation plans they had. Was the Secretary prepared for that? Perhaps the Secretary was astute enough to choose the winter or late fall for his vacation, but as for himself, the present was a much more suitable time; later on he would be much too busy.

The Secretary said he would try again to ask in the interests of clarification whether the words "if we were to consent to U.S. proposals" meant all the elements of the U.S. proposal.

Gromyko answered in the negative, saying that what he had in mind here was the U.S. proposal that each side would have the right to equip the one exempted new type of ICBM with MIRVs or with a single reentry vehicle, at its own discretion.

The Secretary asked about the other elements of our proposal, such as the definition of new types.

Gromyko replied in the negative again, saying that what he had in mind was the essence of the proposal, i.e., the choice of each side as to MIRVs or a single reentry vehicle. The other elements of the proposals of both sides would have to be discussed additionally. He thought the Secretary should now be clear on this matter.

Gromyko said that in general, he would say, the present conversation was taking a very unusual turn. He had asked a very specific question yesterday. He had not received a reply to that question. Now he had been listening to questions asked about his questions. He, too, could ask hundreds of questions on various matters. But, he would point out, his basic question had been formulated with maximum clarity. It concerned a subject to which he and the Secretary had devoted ninety per cent of their time during their last meeting in Moscow, and quite a lot of time during their meeting in Washington. Of course, it was a complex problem, and would probably require time for consideration, although there were others to be discussed as well. In a word, he would tell the Secretary that unless he obtained an answer to the question he had asked yesterday, there would be no official Soviet proposal. After he received an answer, a proposal could be formulated.

The Secretary pointed out that he had not told Gromyko that he was prepared to provide an answer today. What he was trying to do now was to understand Gromyko's question, so as to be able to answer the President when asked about the meaning of that question.

Gromyko said his question was crystal clear. What was unclear about the possibility of the Soviets accepting U.S. views to the effect that each country at its own discretion would decide what new type of missile to deploy, whether it would be MIRVed or not? Up to now the U.S. side had fought hard to get such a solution. If the Secretary had now changed his mind, Gromyko would ask him to say so. If the United States now preferred to have an exception for one new type of ICBM with a single reentry vehicle, Gromyko would only welcome it and would applaud.

The Secretary said he had not changed his mind on that.

Gromyko remarked that the Secretary was not displaying enough flexibility.

Ambassador Warnke said he had been trying to understand what was meant by Gromyko's question on the basis Gromyko had just set out. It seemed to him that the question suggested acceptance of the U.S. proposal on new types in return for movement toward the Soviet position in other areas. Or else, all that it meant was that if we were allowed a new type of ICBM with MIRVs, we would have to accept all other Soviet proposals, including the proposal concerning the definition of new types.

Gromyko said that Warnke had taken the question asked by the Soviet side, had reformulated it himself, twisting it and putting it in a different way. What Gromyko had said was very clear. He had formulated his "core statement" yesterday in the form of a question, and what he had meant was very simple. If the U.S. point of view regarding free choice of MIRVing or non-MIRVing one new type was accepted by the Soviet side, would the United States agree to resolve other unagreed questions on the basis of the proposals tabled by the Soviet Union? (Gromyko stressed and repeated the words "on the basis of.") What was unclear in this question? Of course, he understood that there was still work to be done on other matters, for example on the difference between the two sides regarding timing of dismantling or destruction of systems in excess of agreed levels. But, he was sure that this matter would not present any major problem, at least he hoped so. In a word, up until now the U.S. side had regarded the new types issue as the main issue between us, and now it seemed to be pushing it into the background. Negotiations cannot be conducted in this way, raising all sorts of other question of secondary importance. He concluded that there was no lack of clarity in the Secretary's mind, that he was simply not prepared to answer Gromyko's question today. There was no need to take up time by raising secondary questions. If the Secretary was not prepared to provide a reply today, why not just say so?

The Secretary said that he had told Gromyko at the very outset of their talk today that he was not prepared to give an answer now, but that he wanted to understand what Gromyko's question meant in order to be in a position to explain it to President Carter. From the conversation that had just taken place he concluded that it meant something different than he had thought initially.

Gromyko said he knew that the Secretary knew perfectly well what the question meant.

Warnke said that as he understood it now, Gromyko had been saying that his question meant the following: was it so important for us to be able to deploy a new MIRVed ICBM before 1985 that we were prepared to accept all Soviet proposals on other questions, including the proposal on the definition of new types?

Gromyko said that was somewhat clearer. Of course, it did not mean that the U.S. side must agree to everything else that had been proposed by the Soviet side, that other issues cannot be discussed

with a view to finding mutually acceptable solutions. He repeated that the words "on the basis of Soviet proposals" did not mean that the two sides could not search for mutually acceptable solutions. As he saw it, the Secretary and Warrke had understood his basic question, but now wanted to know how other issues would be resolved. The Soviet Delegation would be prepared to discuss those other second-rate or even third-rate issues. Naturally, there were certain linkages and interrelationships, just like everything else in the world was interrelated. For example, daylight was clearly related to the sun. Of course, the Soviet side was prepared to search for mutually acceptable solutions on the basis of its proposals. In sort, if mutually acceptable solutions for other matters were found, the Soviet side would accept the U.S. concept for one new type of missile. But, this was all part of one package, like daylight and the sun. He could see now that the Secretary was clear in his mind as to the meaning of the main question. He was now simply trying to determine how other matters would be decided.

The Secretary said he had been trying to determine if what was meant here was an all-encompassing, broader solution to the outstanding issues.

Gromyko asked why was it necessary to use such adjectives as "all-encompassing and broader?" What was meant here clearly was that secondary issues would still require further discussion.

The Secretary said he had initially understood the question to mean whether the United States would be prepared to agree on all other issues in accordance with Soviet proposals. He had taken it to mean that there could be no further discussion.

Gromyko said that there were a variety of other issues. He had named some on which the Soviet Union could not retreat from its present position. This included the Backfire issue. Regarding the Backfire he had said that the Soviet Union would not be prepared to change a single common in its unilateral statement. But there were some other issues, in particular modernization, where the two sides will have to search for a mutually acceptable solution. After all, both sides were equally interested in making sure that modernization did not produce new types of strategic offensive arms. He had not meant to imply that there could not be discussion and adjustment on matters of second-rate or third-rate or even fourth-rate importance. Different questions had different importance. Some, such as the Backfire, contained no room for movement; others were a matter for further discussion. As for the Soviet position on numbers of cruise missiles on bombers, he had stated it clearly--there was no room for movement there. However, the fact that everything was being tied together in a package (and he would note that the Secretary, too, acknowledged that all issues were interrelated) should not cause anyone to be afraid of a land mine in that package.

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Gromyko emphasized that agreement had to be reached on the sum total of the issues before the two sides. That was obvious. As for the Backfire, the Soviet unilateral statement could not be expanded in any way. If the U.S. side persisted in further questions about the Backfire, the Soviet side would simply have to raise similar questions about U.S. Phantoms. After all, it should be realized how far the Soviet side had gone. The Secretary had asked about the flight profile in relation to the radius of action of the Backfire, and the Soviet side had provided it. Surely, he was not interested in the en face, the parking profile of that aircraft. There was also the matter of numbers of cruise missiles on bombers, where the Soviet position was firm. Another question concerned timing of dismantling or destruction. On this latter issue the Soviet side had pointed out repeatedly that for practical reasons it could not change the timing. It had agreed to the U.S. proposed time span for reductions. For practical reasons it could not agree to earlier initiation. But, after all, from a military-strategic standpoint, this should not really be of concern to the U.S. side. If one applied common sense here, one would realize that this was a matter of dismantling or destruction rather than further development of arms.

Thus, what the Soviet side had been hinting at in asking the question Gromyko has asked was that if agreement could be reached "in complex," then the Soviet side would be prepared to consider if it could accept the U.S. concept that the sides be free to choose the kind of one new type of ICBM they would develop, test and deploy, MIRVed or with a single reentry vehicle. Gromyko was sure that the Secretary understood that if the Soviet Union did accept that concept and reached agreement on that basis, for a certain period of time the United States would enjoy an advantage. He knew that the United States would choose the MIRVed missile, and the Soviets were prepared to agree to that. If he were to ask the Secretary how he could even propose such a thing, that each side be free to choose in this respect, how would the Secretary answer that? If he were to reply honestly, he would say "yes, for a certain period of time we will have a certain advantage." Of course, over the longer term the Soviet Union would probably equalize that situation, but that will take time.

Warnke wanted to point out that, as Secretary Vance had indicated, we had not decided to go ahead with a new MIRVed ICBM. We had proposed that we would accept a ban on the deployment of all new types of missiles for the period of the Treaty through 1985. Thus, this was not something that we could immediately put into production, but we wanted to keep the option open. Therefore, what we were pushing for in response to the Soviet proposal on new types of ICBMs was that if the Soviet side were free to deploy one new type of ICBM that would fit into its force structure, we, too, should be free to have the only type of ICBM that would fit into our force structure. We were still prepared to ban the flight testing and deployment of all new types for the period of the Protocol, or to ban the deployment of all new types for the period of the Treaty through 1985.

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Gromyko said that did not change the situation. He would reaffirm what he had said on that score and say that he was sure that the U.S. proposal would work to the greater advantage of the United States.

Gromyko again referred to the question of timing of reductions and repeated that this should not be a serious matter of concern since it referred to dismantling or destruction. For practical reasons the Soviet Union could not initiate the process of dismantling or destruction at an earlier date.

The Secretary wanted to ask whether there was a difference in principle between the two sides on the question of fractionation.

Gromyko said that he had spoken to that issue. Statements on it had been made on the Soviet side in Washington, as well as here, and the Soviet side had proposed that this issue be resolved in the context of an overall package settlement. He did not think it was one of the major questions before the two sides. It did have its own significance, of course, but he was sure that the Delegations would be able to discuss and resolve it. He was certain that Warnke and Semenov were ready to go on this issue. But, in principle, he would favor resolving it in the overall context.

Gromyko wondered if the time had come to take the Secretary's list of questions and burn it in the ashtray.

The Secretary thought he now had a better understanding of Gromyko's question than at the beginning of this talk.

Gromyko said he had the impression that the Secretary did understand it indeed.

The Secretary expressed his belief that he did understand Gromyko's question now. He would, of course, get an answer to that question. It might be desirable when we get an answer to the question for Warnke to deliver it in person.

CTB

Noting that Secretary Vance had a specialist on all questions in the person of Ambassador Warnke, Gromyko said that for the purpose of discussing CTB matters he would have to call in his experts.

Ambassador Toon, Chairman Petrosyants, Minister Semenov and Ambassador Dobrynin joined the group for discussion of CTB matters.

Ambassador Warnke expressed his belief that Chairman Petrosyants would agree with him in saying that good progress had been achieved toward a CTB Treaty. The Delegations were now working diligently to develop a separate verification agreement that would contain appropriate provisions. Warnke could really not see any issue of principle remaining. Initially there had been three major issues before the sides:

1. Peaceful nuclear explosions;
2. Verification; and
3. Duration of the Treaty

Warnke would take them up in inverse order, because due to the fact that on September 2 President Brezhnev had agreed to a moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions for the same duration as the Treaty, we could now agree to a limited duration and thus a limited moratorium.

We had agreed in principle that the duration of the Treaty would be either three years or five years. The two sides had also agreed that during the moratorium they would continue to consider together if there was some way to permit resumption of peaceful nuclear explosions without involving military aspects or endangering our common objective of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Thus, we now had substantive agreement on two of the three issues. As for verification, we had agreement in principle. We had given up our traditional insistence on mandatory on-site inspection and had moved toward the Soviet position that such inspection be on a voluntary basis. We still had to work out the circumstances under which on-site inspection would be carried out, and the two sides were working on the conditions for such inspection. For our part, we were working on the assumption that a well substantiated demand for on-site inspection would not very well be rejected without affecting the viability of the Treaty. There were proposals on the table concerning specific numbers of locations for national seismic stations on the territory of the Soviet Union and the United States, and the experts of the two sides were currently engaged in intensive work on this question. Finally, there was no difference of views between the two sides regarding the fact that we were working toward a general and comprehensive test ban, and not merely toward a threshold test ban.

Warnke thought that both sides recognized that there were areas of routine scientific experiments producing very low yield that would have to be provided for. He knew that last year it had been pointed out in the course of discussions that one such area was that of laser fusion as a means of generating electricity. Experiments in that area would produce low nuclear yields, to be measured in terms of pounds. He was sure that there was no intention on either side to interfere with these scientific developments. Chairman Petrosyants would be an expert in this area, and would be familiar with the nature of these experiments.

Thus, Warnke would say, he was satisfied with the progress that had been achieved, and believed the prospects were good. He knew that they should consider together the question of the timing and entry into force of the Agreement, particularly in light of the recent UN Special Session on Disarmament and the proposal to reconstitute the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. There

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were matters of procedure and timing, and how best to enlist international support, that could be worked out between the sides. He hoped that Chairman Petrosyants would in general agree with his review of where we stood at the present time.

Chairman Petrosyants said that, in general, the situation as set out by Ambassador Warnke was correct. Their negotiations were indeed being carried on successfully. The Delegations were engaged in intensive and important work on certain issues. However, he would have to report that they had not yet resolved and, he would even say, not even approached resolution of one major question. Some time ago the Soviet Union had suggested and tabled a proposed text for so-called Article I, the purpose of which it was to define the objectives of the Treaty. The language proposed by the Soviet side very clearly indicated the purposes of the Treaty, and the ultimate objective of complete cessation of nuclear weapon tests in all environments. The U.S. Delegation, on the other hand, had merely set out its considerations in the so-called Working Document, but had not put forward a draft for Article I, i.e., for the Article which was to spell out the main purposes of the Treaty. He would ask that a draft of this Article be presented as soon as possible. That would make it easier to continue the work of the Delegations.

Petrosyants said that the greatest difficulty in the negotiations involved the question of verification. The Soviet UNION was in favor of verification, and in this sense stood on common ground with the United States. The first element of verification was on-site inspection in the event of ambiguous physical phenomena which raised questions about compliance with the Treaty. On-site inspections would be implemented on a voluntary basis. In general, he would say, the work of specifying the functions of the personnel to be involved in on-site inspection was proceeding rather successfully. There were still some differences between the sides on this subject, but Petrosyants did not believe them to be so important as to warrant airing at so important a meeting as the current one. He was sure that he would be able to resolve them with Warnke.

As for the second element of the verification question--automatic national seismic stations--there were still quite a few unresolved questions and quite a few divergent views. The Soviet side believed it would be best to carry out verification by national technical means, including national seismic stations, which were in the possession of all the states involved. The U.S. Delegation had proposed installation of so-called automatically operated seismic stations on each other's territory. He and Warnke had discussed the various characteristics of such stations, their range of operation, etc. At their invitation the principal inventor had come to Geneva, bringing with him documentation and figures. As a result of discussions with specialists, it had been established that to date these stations exist only on the drawing board, and that one

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could not expect even one such station to be assembled in the United States any earlier than October of this year. From a technical standpoint that station was very complex, and when the Soviet side had asked how much time would be required for testing it, the inventor had specified a period of no less than three months. In the Soviet view, it would be impossible to guarantee that a station produced in just one sample and tested for only three months would operate reliably. He believed that it would be quite wrong to jeopardize the Treaty by installing this kind of equipment, since it would be very likely to mislead people. He did not believe it possible to put one's faith into the operation of such a station without having any assurance of the reliability of its operation. One most important element of that station, the so-called authenticity block, did not even exist on the drawing board so far, and would not be completed even by October. For all these reasons he thought the sides should limit themselves to inspection by personnel and by using the technical facilities, including seismic stations, which the sides have at their disposal at present. Finally, the Soviet side believed that it should be possible to divide the verification question into two stages. At the first stage verification would be carried out without the use of national seismic stations on the territory of the other side, and at the second stage they could proceed to the use of improved seismic stations.

Gromyko asked if the two sides had agreed on the possibility of using national seismic stations.

Petrosyants replied in the negative.

Secretary Vance asked what the quality of verification would be during the initial period without improved and installed seismic stations.

Petrosyants replied that first and foremost he would point out that neither side had any intention of violating the Treaty and conducting nuclear explosions.

Gromyko remarked that this should be viewed as the moral policy of all the countries involved.

Petrosyants pointed out something that he thought might be even more important. The United States had in its own country a well-developed network of seismic stations, as well as stations located along the perimeter of Soviet borders, particularly south and east of these borders. Thus, everything was subject to observation and identification. Moreover, there were systems for an international exchange of seismic data from seismic stations. All this, taken together, would in his view assure a good level of verification. This is why the Soviet side had not advanced any proposal to locate seismic stations on the territory of the United States. They simply were not needed.

Gromyko noted that there were evidently three issues that were not as yet finally agreed. The first concerned the purposes of

the Treaty. It was obviously necessary to reach agreement on Article I, specifying that the Treaty was aimed at ensuring a complete ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. It should not be a difficult task to draft such an article. The fact that the United States had not provided a draft so far gave rise to certain doubts on his side. Secondly--duration of the treaty. He had the impression that the United States was losing its taste for the five-year duration it had previously proposed. When he had been in Washington last and had indicated that a five-year term might be acceptable, he had thought that he had made a concession that would be readily grasped by the United States. He thought if a three-year duration were now to be established, people would become suspicious that the participants to the Treaty were developing new facilities and would engage in a new round of testing after the three-year period. Third, as to verification, some progress had been achieved in view of the understanding on the participation of personnel on a voluntary basis.

As for automatic equipment, Gromyko thought it would be best of all if agreement were reached to use the technical facilities at the disposal of each of the parties on a national basis. If any third country were to ask the United States to install so and so many stations on its territory, no one would object. But, in the absence of such requests, national technical means should be sufficient. After all, the initial participants in this Treaty were countries that had adequate technical means at their disposal. Moreover, the automatic "machine" the U.S. side had mentioned was still on the drawing board. From the standpoint of the tasks it was to perform, it was a very crude piece of equipment. It could not distinguish between nuclear explosions and other explosions carried out for economic purposes, such as mining, for example. Would it then be necessary to call out the fire brigades each time that such a crude machine gave a signal? He would surely not characterize that kind of equipment as a miracle of technology. In fact, the use of a machine that could not distinguish between nuclear explosions and other explosions, carried out for economic purposes, could be likened to the use of an automatic lawn mower one controlled from one's living room, which in addition to cutting the grass also destroyed one's flower beds. It seemed to him that this whole question should be viewed in proper perspective and that agreement not be made contingent on some "miracle machine" of doubtful merit. He thought the two sides should agree to use the national technical means at their disposal for purposes of verification.

Gromyko turned to the fourth and last point--what should the agreement to be concluded be like? The United States somehow wanted it to provide for some kind of an exception. The Soviet side wanted to ensure that all nuclear weapon tests were ruled out under the Treaty, because in dealing with nuclear weapons it would make little difference whether the yield was expressed in terms of kilotons or pounds. We did have a threshold test ban agreement

between us, although it had not yet been ratified and had not entered into force. Why, then, should our two countries sign a second threshold agreement? No, what was needed was a Treaty completely banning all nuclear weapon tests. A new threshold agreement would only create doubts and make an unfavorable impression on world public opinion. As for scientific research, that would be a different matter, but it must not permit testing of nuclear weapons. If the U.S. side was aiming at another threshold agreement, the Soviet Union could not agree to such a concept. He would want to see the United States display greater flexibility in this respect. Of course, the distance between the two sides had been reduced to some extent, and that was good. But a certain distance nevertheless still remained.

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The Secretary wanted to comment briefly on the four points Gromyko had made, and would then ask Mr. Warnke to state his views. First, concerning the purposes to be spelled out in Article I of the Treaty. There was no difference between the two sides on the question that what we were seeking was a complete test ban. As for the time when we would be in a position to table our own version of Article I, he would ask Mr. Warnke to comment after he had finished. As for duration--we have been considering whether a three-year term or a five-year term would be most appropriate for the Treaty. When our consideration of this matter was completed, we would be in touch. On the question of verification--the form of the instrument to be used in connection with verification was important from the standpoint of ratification in the United States, and it was a matter that would receive major attention during Congressional discussions in the process of ratification. Finally, on the fourth point--what we were talking about was laboratory research. There was no real difference between us in this respect.

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Warnke said he did not have much to add to the Secretary's comments. On the first point--we had submitted a Working Paper, and were developing an Article I which we hoped to submit in the near future. Secondly, regarding duration of the Treaty. Of course, one of the things to be considered in this connection was the impact of the Treaty on other countries, and the need to further the non-proliferation objectives we had in common. The Soviet Union had proposed a three-year duration. Warnke had listened to the arguments of the Soviet Delegation and had found them to be quite persuasive. Third, on verification, he did not believe it necessary to comment any further on on-site inspection. As for national seismic stations, he had thought that we had reached the point where the issue was not whether or not such stations were to be used, but rather when, how many and where. If the Soviet Union was now changing its position in this respect, Warnke could only view this as a serious setback to the negotiations. He believed it was necessary to recognize that neither side anticipated that we would not have an agreement that would replace the current one after three years. After all, it would hardly be worthwhile to negotiate on a three-year agreement unless we expected it to be replaced at the expiration of that period.

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Warnke said he believed that one of the key factors for determining whether or not there would be another treaty banning nuclear testing would be the question of whether or not there was sufficient confidence in the verification procedures in the treaty now being negotiated. As Secretary Vance had pointed out, acceptability of the Treaty to the U.S. Senate would depend in large part upon Senate satisfaction with the verification procedures. He believed that the national seismic stations would prove to be an important element in such procedures. He further believed that from the standpoint of furtherance of our common non-proliferation objective, and from the standpoint of the impact on other countries, it was necessary to be sure that there were verification procedures and facilities that would give them confidence that the nuclear powers had stopped nuclear testing. Therefore, he would agree with what he understood Chairman Petrosyants had suggested--that there was the possibility of dividing verification into two stages, recognizing that time would be required before equipment could be installed in connection with these national seismic stations. However, he would not feel confident unless there was acceptance of the principle that after a certain period of time national seismic stations would in fact be installed. Thus, he felt that we ought to continue discussing the question of how many such stations would be installed, where and when. However, he believed that if there was a difference in principle on the entire question, he would say quite frankly that his optimism would be seriously set back. Concerning the technology involved, he did not think we needed to fear that the equipment in question would operate like the lawn mower to which Gromyko had referred. He believed that installing the equipment would be a substantial step forward in terms of verification and rather than raise questions, would settle them and promote confidence.

Gromyko said that Warnke had avoided the question Gromyko had asked. He would therefore repeat it: will that equipment be capable of distinguishing between nuclear explosions and ordinary non-nuclear explosions carried out for economic purposes?

Warnke said the answer to that question was no.

Gromyko said that in his country, with its vast territory, hundreds and perhaps thousands of economic explosions were carried out annually, especially in the eastern part of the country. He would ask, then, will there be fire brigades constantly traveling throughout his country pursuant to signals received from that machine? He thought this would hardly promote confidence on either side. Such were his views concerning the equipment in question. As for national means, on its own territory each country could install as many machines as it felt were needed.

Warnke thought that Gromyko's comments were not relevant to the issue. Obviously there will be chemical explosions, whether or not one had seismic stations. Chemical explosions could be

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appropriately dealt with through pre-notification procedures. But, he would point out, this was not a problem that would be created by the stations; the problem existed in any case. Otherwise one might also say that national technical means should not be very good, because if they are, they will raise questions. For purposes of verification we had proposed the use of national technical means, voluntary on-site inspection and these additional seismic stations. Without all three elements there would not be adequate confidence in compliance with a complete test ban. A limited threshold treaty would be futile in terms of furthering our non-proliferation objectives.

Gromyko said he could see that Warnke was quite hypnotized by his machine, a machine that could not distinguish between nuclear and chemical explosions. Well, that was his business. In a country as large as the Soviet Union there would be many chemical explosions for many different economic purposes. Could that machine distinguish chemical explosions from nuclear explosions? No, it could not. In the case of nuclear explosions, could it distinguish between weapons related explosions and economic explosions? No, it could not. It does not even exist as yet, has not been tested, and already the U.S. side was trying to impose such equipment on other countries. The Soviet Union was not in favor of that. The Soviets would like to see a more reliable system of verification. As far as the present parties to the negotiations were concerned, i.e., the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, they were quite capable of assuring reliable verification through the use of their own national technical facilities. As for the number of stations, of course the Delegations could discuss that matter; he would not reject that. But, things should be simplified and certain flexibility displayed.

Further, Gromyko wanted to be sure that Secretary Vance and Mr. Warnke were not talking about nuclear explosions as such, but of laboratory experiments and research for scientific purposes. He would like to get some clarification of the nature of such laboratory explosions. If they were what he thought they were, perhaps there was a way out. What would be the scientific purpose of such laboratory experiments?

Warnke had two comments to make. First, he would return to his hypnotic machine. He would point out again that the chemical explosion problem would not be created by that machine. Practically, the solution to that problem would be to provide more information regarding the location of such explosions.

Gromyko interrupted to say that Warnke was just confirming what Gromyko had said.

Warnke would not pretend that the equipment would be perfect. However, it would be better than anything we had now. To object to the equipment because, while it could detect chemical explosions,

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it could not distinguish them from nuclear explosions, would be tantamount to saying that we must reduce the crime rate by reducing the number of police reports. Finally, regarding the question of scientific experiments. What we had in mind were routine scientific laboratory experiments, producing low yields. We were not proposing that either of us be enabled thereby to test nuclear weapons.

Gromyko felt it necessary to ask an additional question. When Warnke spoke of laboratory experiments did he really have in mind experiments conducted in an enclosed building, such as the buildings in which laboratories were usually located? Or did he have in mind experiments conducted in open spaces, somewhere in Nevada, or Nebraska, or some desert area?

Warnke replied that what he had in mind were experiments conducted in a reusable laboratory.

Gromyko said he could see that he had not received an answer.

Mr. Korniyenko added that the type of laboratory to be used required definition.

Secretary Vance said it was his understanding that what we were talking about were experiments in an enclosed space.

Gromyko said it would be necessary to obtain additional information and confirmations regarding the purposes of the experiments, if the U.S. side could provide them, because the Treaty placed great responsibility on the three countries involved.

The Secretary expressed his hope that the Soviet side would give some further thought to what appeared to be a radical change in the position of the Soviet side with respect to the machine Warnke had talked about. He could tell Gromyko that without doubt these three elements, this tripartite verification process, would be very important in terms of Congressional consideration.

Gromyko said that the U.S. Government would best know how to deal with the U.S. Congress; he could not provide any advice in this respect. At the present time he could add nothing to the Soviet position. It seemed to him that the Soviet side had displayed a great deal of flexibility in the negotiation of the CTB Treaty. Thus, when the main question had appeared to be the question of duration, the Soviet Union had accepted the U.S. position, but now seismic stations were regarded as a matter of new importance.

Warnke said he could not accept the statement that this was a new matter. It had been an essential part of our position from the very beginning.

Gromyko recalled that in May President Carter had characterized the question of duration as being the most important question. He would refer the Secretary to the record of that conversation to confirm this fact.

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The Secretary said that what the President had in mind was based on his impression that duration was one matter on which there was disagreement. In the CTB negotiations, duration and verification were of coequal importance.

Gromyko reminded the Secretary that in May he had told President Carter that the Soviet Union would be prepared to accept a five-year term for the Treaty in the event that all other matters were agreed, including verification. The President quite definitely stressed duration as the most important question.

He could see that there was still some distance between the respective positions on the test ban treaty. This was not a simple matter; he would suggest that the Delegations continue their work. In general, the attitude of the Soviet Union, based on principle, toward the advisability of concluding a treaty on the complete banning of nuclear weapon tests had not changed in the least. He continued to believe that this would be an important international step. He would only ask the Secretary not to assume that the Soviet Union was interested in conclusion of such a treaty to any greater degree than the United States. In his view, all three countries negotiating the treaty were equally interested in its conclusion.

The Secretary wanted to assure Gromyko that we assumed that all were equally interested in achieving this extremely important goal.

Gromyko said it was good to know that we shared the same objective.

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